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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT J. ERISHMAN and
DARYLENE L. ERISHMAN, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

MARR B. OVERMAN,
Defendant and Respondent.

RESPONDENT
BRIEF OF
Case No. 9226

RESPONDENTS BRIEF
.,

------

STATE:NIENT OF FACTS
On the 20th day of March, 1957, the plaintiffs and
the defendants entered into an agreement for the sale and
purchase of a hon1e located in Logan, Utah. Prior to the
signing of the contract, the plaintiffs had signed a written
listing agreement and gave the same to an agent of the
Utah Mortgage Loan Company, a real estate agency. On
the listing there was given certain information as to the improvements on the ho1ne and the property, among which
it was listed, that there was Sewer connecting the home
to the Logan City Sewer System, when in fact no such
sewer or connection existed. It was admitted by the
plainttiff that he gave this false info1mation as to the
sewer connection. It was this listing that was shown to
the defendant a \von1an with 5 children who was lookincr
b
for a home.
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-3The Defendant visited the premises and went over
the listing with the real estate agent. She found that
everything was as listed as far as she was able to observe
vvhen visiting the premises. The Defendant testified that
she relied on the listing.
R-17

Q You didn't ask Mr. Baugh about it other than to
observe the listing?
A Yes, I did. That is, I didn't ask him. He quoted
to me that "I have a home that is connected to
the sewer, it's down close to the school; it's within
walking distance from town," and he said, it's
completely furnished."
And it was frankly admitted by the Plaintiff that the
false information as to the sewer connection was given by
the Plaintiff in the listing agreement to the Utah Mortgage
Loan Agent, and that Mr. Baugh's statement was taken
from information gained therefrom. The transaction substantially was carried on in reliance on the listing agreement and there was very little negotiation between Mrs.
Overman and the Plaintiff personally. Mrs. Overman
entered into possession of the property on March 20, 1957
and made a dovm payment of $500.00 which left a balance
due of $5,650.00, bearing interest at 5o/o per annum. There
was a monthly payment due under the contract of $50.74.
The first monthly payment was May 1, 1957. Everything
went smoothly until July 18, 1958 when the Defendant
found that she needed repairs to the home to an extent
greater than she had ready cash to take care of and on
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-4July 18, 1959, a letter was written to the Plaintiffs explaining the circumstances and proposing a refinancing arrangement, wherein the Plaintiff would have received $1500.00
cash and substantially the same monthly payment on a
second mortgage (Defendant's Exhibit No. 1 ) .
On August 12, 1958, the Defendant received a letter
indicating that they were willing to take the refinancing
arrangement (Defendant's Exhibit No. 2). About the
same time the Defendant began to have trouble with the
sewer system and sewage backed up into her basement.
In investigating the sewer difficulty, it was discovered
that the home was not connected to the Logan City sewer
system as it was represented to be by the Plaintiffs in the
listing, and as she had understood it to be when she purchased the property. On August 30, 1958, the Defendant
wrote a letter and informed the Plaintiff that the home
was not connected to the sewer system, as it had been represented to her to be, and that it would be necessary for
her to make the connection in order to make the home
livable. She also told the Plaintiffs the approximate cost
involved in making the sewer connection, and asked them
what they would be willing to do in taking care of the
same. (Exhibit No.3).
In answer to the letter of August 30, 1958, the Plaintiff wrote (Exhibit No. 4) "Since we listed the house as
being connected to the sewer, although we were not
cognizant of the fact it was not, we feel that an allowance
of $100.00 is all we can make. This allowance of $100.00
can be deducted from the amount owed when the second
mortgage arrangements are made."
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It should be noted by the Court that the parties were
still negotiating both a settlement as to the sewer connection and arranging details for refinancing as of September 8, 1958, and that the Plaintiffs admitted their
responsibility for the sewer, but did not offer to take care
of the full cost or the out-of-pocket expenses caused by the
necessity to install the missing sewer.
The Defendant made no payments under the contract
after she discovered that the sewer was not connected, and
she continued to try and settle the matter. In her letter
marked Defendant's Exhibit No.5 she informed the Plaintiff that she was entitled to all of the costs of the sewer
installation, credited on the escrow agreement. The matter continued on without credit being given or any agreement being made as to a settlement for the payment of
the sewer until March 11, 1959, when the Plaintiffs served
notice on the Defendant declaring a forfeiture of the escrow agreement.
On ~1ay 22, 1959, the Plaintiffs filed a complaint
asking for damages for wrongful detainer and alleging
that the contract was null and void because of failure in
payments from September 1, 1958.
The Defendant filed an Answer and Counter Claim
wherein the Defendants alleged that the contract would
not have been entered into except for the false representation as to the condition of the home and that it was connected to the Logan City Sewer, and the Defendants
asked for relief which would essentially restore the parties
to the status quo.
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ARGUMENT POINT I
There was ample evidence to support the court's finding of fact No. 3.
Jl.-34 Direct examination of Defendant:

Q You didn't ask Mr. Baugh about it other than to
observe the listing?
A Yes, I did. That is, I didn't ask him. He quoted
to me that "I have a home that is connected to
the sewer, it's down close to the school, it's within
walking distance ~rom town," and he said, "it's
completely furnished."
R-Page 34 c'And will you state to the jury, why you
wouldn't have entered into this contract.''
A.

I borrowed money to make the down payment on
the contract. I was working on a shoe string.
If I had thought for one minute that I would have
additional expense for the connection of the
sewer I would never have entered into it.

Q "That is you wouldn't have entered into the contract under the same terms.
A "That's right."
Exhibit 11 shows the listing agreement and that it
listed the sewer and the connection. It is this same listing
that was checked over by Mrs. Overman. Also that there
was substantial evidence in the record to support finding
in Fact number 7.
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-7The Plaintiff testified as to all of the costs of the
improvements and the defendant's witness, George Judah,
testified as to their effect on the market value of the property.
R-60 Mr. Judah testified that he was acquainted with
the property in question and that he had examined the
property just prior to the time that Mrs. Overman purchased it and that he was acquainted with the position
of the furnace in the home and its general condition. He
also testified that he had examined the furnace just prior
to the trial and knew the condition of the new heating
system which had been installed and that all of the
changes that had been made had been desirable and had
increased the value of the home.
Mr. Judah was asked if he had an opinion as to how
much the heating system had improved the value of the
home. He stated that the actual cost would be as close as
he could come to a reasonable value of the appreciation
of the property as a result of the improvement, and that
this would be between $700 and $800, and that $800 would
not be unreasonably high figure.
R-65 Mr. Judah testified that the improvements to the
back steps would also add to the value of the home the
cost involved. The Plaintiff R-32 testified that the material for the back porch and steps cost $123.00 and that
the labor was $81.00. The sewer connection cost an
additional $239.00 giving a total of out-of-pocket expenses
of $1,243.00. He also testified that after considering a
five or six percent depreciation in the property that it
would be sold for around $7,000.00 or a little better. This
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-8would put the appreciation of the p.roperty at $900,00.
Therefore, there was evidence to support the jury in a
special verdict at R-11 where the jury found after hearing
the testimony of all of the witnesses and visiting and inspecting the premises and being instructed by the Court
found that the reasonable value of the improvements made
by the Defendant was $837.00.
It is stated in the Appellants Brief that because a
sewer connection was not mentioned in the Escrow Agreement that it was not a part of the contract and that the
Plaintiffs did not intend· to convey the property with a
sewer connection. In this respect the respondents refer
the court to the listing agreement (Exhibit 11) and also
Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 4 wherein the Plaintiff admits that
he did in fact intend to convey a sewer with the property.
As the sewer was a part of the real property it was
not necessary to specifically state in the contract that
there was to be a sewer connection as it would be conveyed in the general description of the real property and
in this case all of the parties have admitted in court that
it was intended to be so.
The Respondent points out to the Court that it is not
relying for its relief on the doctrine of fraud or deceit, but
rather on a material misrepresentation of fact. It is contended that the quotation, taken from the 24 Am. Jur.
Section 32, Page 377, Fraud and Deceit, does in fact support the Defendant's position, even though in this case
we are not relying on fraud. ·
The Plaintiff has directed the Court to the Testimony
of Grant W. Campbell to show that there was no increased
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-9efficiency due to the change over from propane gas to
natural gas. It should be pointed out in this respect that
on the cross examination of Mr. Campbell that he was not
sure of the year in which the gas bills were incurred which
he referred to on direct examination and that some of the
gas bills were probably from years prior to the time she
took possession of the property in question and made it
impossible to distinguish what the actual fuel bills were
for the Erishman home.
R-78

Q

You wouldn't know whether it was 1956, 57, or
57-58.

A

That is correct.

Q

It's 57-58?

A I don't say that sir.
R-84

Q

Now, if in fact Mrs. Overman didn't move into
the house until some time in March of 1957, and
I make an offer of proof to that extent, your
honor, can explain why your records would show
that you made deliveries to Mrs. Overman October 12, December 19, and January 28 of 1956?

A

It's just like I told you a few moments ago. I
wasn't sure on the date today, but I know that
when maybe I should clarify myself a little more
on one factor, Sir. When she converted to natural
gas, it became necessary that I pick up a tank
that she had.
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It is submitted that although the plaintiffs witness,
Mr. Campbell, made some definite statements on his
direct examination as to the actual costs of heating with
propane gas by Mrs. Overm~ that his cross examination
makes it quite clear that he was not even sure that the
charges were made for gas used in the home in question
or that they were all charges for gas. However, he did
make one point clear and that was that it was cheaper to
heat with Natural gas than with propane gas.
R-82 and R-83

Q An where there is natural gas available, isn't it
generally considered cheaper to operate from
natural gas than it is propane gas?
A

Yes, Sir.

Q

Considerably cheaper, isn't it?

A I have heard statements anywhere from one per
cent up to sixty-five per cent.

Q Do you have an opinion yourself as to how much?
A Yes, I do.

Q Would you state that?
A Approximately fifteen per cent.

Q So in any event, even if you had a propane system
there that was adequate, it would have a tendencv to enhance the value of the house because
it would be cheaper to heat it with natural gas,
wouldn't it?
.'
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A

I don't know that it would enhance the value of
the home. It would decrease the living cost of
the home.

It is submitted that the jury and the court had substantial evidence to support the jury verdict.
The Plaintiff in her brief on Page 13 argues that the
sewer was not considered important by the parties as it
was not mentioned specifically, in the agreement which
was not the final contract entered into by the parties, and
that for that reason it cannot be considered as an important item. It should be noted that both of the parties
in their testin1ony which was not objected to at the trial,
admitted that the sewer was taken into consideration and
the Plaintiff frankly admits that he intended to sell property connected to the Logan City Sewer, and the Defendant in her testimony as set out R-15 that she intended to
purchase property connected to the Logan City sewer.
This fact is borne out by the entire record, and the importance of this fact was testified to by the Defendant in
that she stated that she had to borrow money to make
the down payment and that every item that might increase
the price was certainly important to her. It is also clear
that a sewer which had been represented to exist by the
Plaintiff buried in the ground is not an easy item to separate from the real property and it necessarily is included
along with the general description of the real property
which is to be conveyed and it is not an item which would
have to be specifically set apart to make sure that it did
go with the real property. The Defendant did check over
the items in the listing and all that she was able to see
bv her examination of the property indicated that the
.I
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-12.listing was correct. It is submitted that the examination
would not reasonably raise any suspicion on the part of
the Defendant that the sewer which they could not see
by a visual examination was not actually as represented.
The Plaintiff states that the earnest money receipt
and offer of purchase which was entered into on March
16, 1957,_ was controlling as to what was considered important by the parties and that because the sewer connection was not marked on that agreement, that it cannot
be considered as important. . It is pointed out by the
respondent that this was not the final contract of the
parties and that none of the improvements were listed
for the simple reason that this was not the final contract.
The final agreement which does not provide a special
square to be crossed out for sewer connection was entered
into on March 20, 1957, and it is Defendant's contention
that the general description of the real property by meets
and bounds included the sewer with the general description, which was represented in the escrow agreement and
was intended to be covered as such by both of the parties.
POINT 2

THE ATTE~1PT AT FORFEITURE \VAS NOT
EFFECTIVE.
It is alleged by the appellants that the contract had
been forfeited and that because of such forefeiture the
contract was not subject to recision at the time of this
trial. However, at the time that the Plaintiffs attempted
their fodeiture under the provisions of the contract, there
were certain credits that were due to the Defendant by
reason of the Plaintiffs misrepresentation and the parties
had been negotiating for the settlement of the same, but
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no agreement had been reached. Under these circumstances, the courts were generally in accord that a forfeiture could not be declared and advantage be taken of
a forfeiture clause while the vendor is in default. 134
A.L.R. 1065.
VENDEE'S RIGHT TO RECOVER BACK AMOUNT
PAID UNDER EXECUTORY CONTRACT FOR SALE
OF LAND.
Approaching the matter somewhat differently, it may
be said that there is good ground for distinguishing between the case of a vendee a refund from a vendor who
stands on a subsisting cantract which he is able to perform, and who demands specific performance, or damages
as for total breach by the vendee, and a case where the
vendor, because of his own default or inability to perform
is not able to confront the vendee with an obligation of
continued performance. In the first case the contract
remains alive for all purposes and bars a recovery by the
vendee, since, according to the general American Doctrine,
his obligation to perform excludes any right to a refund.
But in the second case, the vendor's acts or the circumstances as to the title or otherwise, may relieve the vendee of any obligation to continue performance and at the
same time free him of any liability to forfeiture, since the
cases are generally inconsistent with the idea that a vendor
in default may enforce a forfeiture. The case now before
the court is one where vendor had materially misrepresented the property to the defendant vendee and this was
discovered prior to the plaintiff claiming any default and
after this the defendant claimed that she was entitled to
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-14-

certain credits which she was never given. There was no
dispute that the defendant was entitled to some credit
but the parties were still attempting to negotiate a settlement when the plaintiff attempted to declare a forfeiture.
Carpenter vs. First Trust & Savings Bank 54 P2d
495 has been cited by the Appellant to show that
assurances by the vendor that improvements would
be replaced, was not grounds to justify a delay of the
vendee of giving notice of her election to rescind. It
is pointed out that in that case the court found that
the evidence did not support a finding that such
assurances had been given and upheld a finding by
the lower court that such assurances had not been
given.
It is suggested that in fact because of the wording
used, that such assurances would justify a delay in the
vendee making an election.
The Defendant had demanded that the cost of the
sewer connection be credited in full to the payments on
the contract, and the plaintiff had offered to pay only
$100.00 or only about half of the price.
Rienhart vs. Welchaman, Oregon case 65 P2nd 1420,
134 A.LR.
"Where the time of the esssence provision of the
contract had been waived the court seemed to concede that an ineffectual attempt to forfeit the contract by unreasonably short notice and a retaking of
the land would have rendered the vendor liable to
return what had been paid on the contract.
The letters, Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and 4 make it clear that
the Plaintiff had waived by his action any claim up to
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September 8, 1958, any claim for forfeiture due to late
payments and that at that time there was in dispute the
exact amount due on the contract and the amount which
was to be credited for the cost of the sewer connection,
and Defendants Exhibit No. 5 was September 19, 1958,
makes a demand for the actual cost of the sewer connection in the sum of $243.30. Under these circumstances,
the law is clear that the plaintiff was in no position to take
advantage of the forfeiture clause of the contract. That
there could be no continuing default on the part of the
Defendant as long as the damages had not been determined or a settlement had been reached as to the damages
caused by the false representation of the Plaintiff. The
Defendant made her position clear by refusing any further
payment on the contract until these matters were cleared
up, and no payments were made after the discovery that
the sewer was not connected. Therefore, the attempt
to declare a forfeiture, under these circumstances, would
be of no effect in cancelling the rights of the Defendant
under the contract or which may have arisen due to the
misrepresentation of the Plaintiff's vendor.
The appellants have cited the Case of Peck vs. Judd
226 P2d 712 for the proposition that the defendant
had waived her right to recover for the misrepresentation be cause of the delay in giving up the property.
This case can be distinguished on several points,
( 1 ) there was no showing in this case of any misleading as to adjustments to take care of the fraud or any
new contract which the parties had tentatively agreed
to enter into which was the reason for the delay as
in the present case, as is clearly shown by the letters
which were entered into evidence. Also, the cited
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case involves an apartment house where there were
large sums of money paid in rent to the d~fendant
each month which was clearly prejudicial to the rights
of the plaintiff.
POINT 3
THAT THE DEFENDANT RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO RECOVER ALL IMPROVEMENTS THE
AMOUNT TO \VHICH THEY HAD ENHANCED IN
MARKET VALUE THE HOME AND ALL MONEY
PAID IN RELIANCE ON THE CONTRACT MINUS
A REASONABLE RENTAL VALUE FOR THE PROPERTY WHILE SHE WAS IN POSSESSION.
The right to relief in this type of a case is set out in
9 Am. Jur. Cancellation of Contracts, Section 40, Page
385. "On the other hand, a vendee in possession who
rescinds a contract for the sale of land because of the
misrepresentation of the vendor is entitled to the purchase
money paid, the value of permanent improvements erected
in good faith, th~ amount of taxes paid, and interest on
these several sums deducting from the aggregate the value
of the rent while the vendee remained in possession. As
to the latter item, however, it should be noted that the
vendee will not be obliged to pay rent in excess of the
profits actually receiv~d."
There was no reason for Mrs. Ove1man to doubt, after
receiving the letter from Mr. Erishn1an, but that the misrepresentation as to the sewer was the result of an honest
mistake on the part of Mr. Erishman, and under these
circumstances, she had a duty to give him an opportunity
to corr~ct his mistake and she had every re~son to believe
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that it would be taken care of in a reasonable manner.
This is evident from the correspondence of the party in
Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Kerns vs. Bank of Mantou, 242 Pac. 2nd 817
In this case the plaintiff was sold a parcel of land
and in checking over the land actually conveyed,
found that it was not the same land as had been represented and the defendant claimed that he had waived
his rights to recision because of paying the taxes and
finding a buyer for the property after he knew of the
mistake.
The court held that these were not acts of dominion over the property, as the plaintiff had a duty to
protect the property and maintain it in order to preserve his right to recision.
In the case before the court the defendant was
placed in a similar position when the sewer stopped
working the home became unlivable and it became
necessary to replace the sewer to maintain the value
of the property and backing of the Sewer caused the
back steps to become unusable and it was necessary
to repair them in order to maintain the property, also
the repairs to the ceilings were certainly an item
necessary to the maintenance of the property.
Certainly all of these items were such as would
mitigate the damages of the defendants which the
defendant had a duty to do at least to a reasonable
extent.
9 Am. Jur.- Cancellation of Instruments, Sec. 32,
pp. 377 and 78.
The jurisdiction of equity to decree the cancellation
of an instrument because of the time of its execution the
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parties, or even one of them, labored under a mistake of
fact, provided that such mistake is material to the transaction and affects the substance thereof, rather than a mere
incident or the inducement for entering into it, is well
recognized and frequently invoked, especially if an element of fraud is present or a confidential relationship
exists. This rule is applicable whether the instrument
rel~tes to an executory agreement of one that has been
executed. However, before granting relief it must be
made to appear that the fact concerning which the mistake
was made was one that animated and controlled the conduct of the parties. The court must be satisfied that but
for the mistake the complainant would not have assumed
the obligation from which he seeks to be relieved.

A contract will not be rescinded for a mistake in favor
of the complainant, correction of which, upon its discovery, he refused to allow.
It is clear that any of the improvements which the
court allowed the defendant to recover for were improvements which would be reflected in the increased sale
value of the home and would be a windfall to the plaintiff.
This would be rewarding the plaintiff for his misleading the defendant into believing that he would agree
to a refinancing arrangement and that the misrepresentation as to the sewer connection was only and honest
mistake for which she could expect a reasonable compensation. The plaintiff had been planning to make the improvements prior to her discovery of the sewer problem
and that to allow the plaintiff to recover the improvements
which had been put on the property as a result of his
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own misleading would be contrary to the rules of equity
whic should govern the court in setting the damages in a
case of this kind. The general rules of restoring the
defendant to the status quo which should govern the court
in a case of this kind does not limit the court in all cases
to the time of the discovery of an honest mistake or misrepresentation. These rules are set out in 9 Am. Jur. Sec.
39, Page 384.
"Restoration of Defendant to Status Quo. Under the
maxim of equity that he who seeks equity must do equity,
the plaintiff in an action to cancel or rescind an instrument must generally, as a condition of obtaining such
relief, restore the defendant to the position which he
occpied before the transaction in question. The plaintiff
is generally required to restore or offer to restore, the benefits he has received, not as a condition of acquiring the
right to sue, but because of the equitable maxim that he
who seeks equity must do equity. Certainly the plaintiff
will not be allowed to derive any unconscionable advantage from the cancellaion and usually he will be denied
relief when it is not possible sustantially to restore the
defendant to the status quo. The mere inability of the
plaintiff to make restoration does not relieve him of his
obligation to do so, or permit the court to grant him relief.
Thus, a vendor of land who sues in equity to rescind a
conveyance or cancel a recorded contract to convey, will
be required to restore the consideration received by him.
CONCLUSION
That as this is an attempt by appellants to enforce a
forfeiture provision at a time when they themselves were
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-20in default because of their false representation as to the
sewer, and further to limit recovery by respondents because they were able to get the defendant to believe that
they were willing to make proper adjustments, and lead
her to beleive that they would allow refinancing to take
care of improvements on the home, that a Court of Equity
should not allow them to have the benefit of improvements
made as a result of this type of leading on.
Certainly it would be unconscionable for the plaintiff
to receive the benefits of the improvements made in reliance on negotiations which could be expected to lead
her to believe that there had been an honest mistake that
would be taken care of and also that they would agree to
a type of refinancing so that she would be able to pay for
these improvements.
That under the circumstances of this case, that it was
proper and in accordance with the laws to restore the
defendant to the status quo by awarding to her the sums
paid under the contract and the value of the improvements
she had made on the home less a reasonable rental while
she was in possession. And that the judgment of the District Court was supported both by the law and the facts
as appears from record..
Respectfully submitted,
DAINES & DAINES
Robert W. Daines
David R. Daines
Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents.
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